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Abstract 
Innovation is the direct intended product of certain styles in research, but not of others. Fundamental 
conflicts between descriptive vs inferential statistics, deductive vs inductive hypothesis testing, and 
exploratory vs pre-planned confirmatory research designs have been played out over decades, with winners 
and losers and consequences. Longstanding warnings from both academics and research-funding interests 
have failed to influence effectively the course of these battles. The NIH publicly studied and diagnosed 
important aspects of the problem a decade ago, resulting in outward changes in the grant review process but 
not a definitive correction. Specific reforms could deliberately abate the damage produced by the current 
overemphasis on inferential statistics, power estimates, and prescriptive study design. Such reform would 
permit a reallocation of resources to historically productive rapid exploratory efforts and considerably 
increase the chances for higher-impact research discoveries. We can profit from the history and foundation 
of these conflicts to make specific recommendations for administrative objectives and the process of peer 
review in decisions regarding research funding. © 2013 S. Kern 
 
 
 
“There is nothing more necessary to the man of science than its history, and the logic of discovery…: 
the way error is detected, the use of hypothesis, of imagination, the mode of testing.” – Lord Acton, 
quoted by Karl Popper (2) 
 “The most striking feature of the normal research problems we have just encountered is how little they 
aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal…everything but the most esoteric detail is 
known in advance, and the typical latitude of expectation is only somewhat wider…Normal science 
does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.” – Thomas Kuhn (4) 
A pessimist, an optimist, an inferential statistician, and a descriptive statistician go into a bar. They 
order beers for everyone. When their own drinks arrive, the pessimist complains that his glass came 
half empty. The optimist expresses begrudging satisfaction that his is at least half full. The inferential 
statistician explains that one cannot exclude the null hypothesis, which holds that the half-full and half-
empty glasses have been shorted by the same amount of beer. The descriptive statistician shakes his 
head, explaining that he saw the bartender switch to larger glasses after he had used all of the others. 
 
 
Academic research productivity is a subject of active 
research and discussion. Among the major determinants 
of research productivity is the research mix: the 
proportions of research devoted to novelty, incremental 
knowledge, or confirmatory research (5). It thus becomes 
critical to examine whether the objectives of biomedical 
research innovation are optimally served by current 
practices. This line of analysis leads through firmly 
established historical battlegrounds of publication and 
funding that remain crucial today. We must examine the 
key schisms in scientific and statistical philosophy, 
revisiting the fundamental questions of interest to Kuhn 
and Popper, Pearson and Tukey. We can then examine the 
administrative principles governing research policy 
decisions and consider specific recommendations to 
rebalance the research mix towards a specific goal of 
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driving biomedical innovation. 
The two branches of statistics 
What are statistics? 
Statistics are numerical or graphical summaries of a 
sample, or group of subjects. A similar summary, 
characterizing an entire population, is termed a parameter, 
but parameters are seldom measured in biomedical 
research. Statistical analysis uses summary numbers by 
organizing them, observing them, and/or inferring their 
relationships to each other. Almost any summary 
statement concerning the information in a database is 
likely to contain a statistic. A database of primary data, 
however, is not a statistic. “Statistics” also refers to a 
group of methods providing the analysis. 
Descriptive and inferential statistics differ 
Descriptive and inferential statistics are the two 
major phyla of the statistical kingdom of mathematics. It 
is essential to explore the difference in some detail. The 
difference serves as a foundation for analyzing problems 
in the research enterprise and for recommending changes 
in research policies.  
Overlap exists, and neither discipline is ignorant of 
the other. For example, an intuitive understanding of an 
association can be described using only the observed 
values (e.g., imagine that all 300 patients with the 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome were found to have 
the AIDS virus, and a corroborative study in a sample of 
500 additional similar patients found no exceptions to this 
pattern of association). Or, one could statistically infer a 
particular likelihood after observing an initial sample 
(e.g., after the first study, one could calculate the high 
numerical likelihood that more than 450 patients in the 
second sample would be found to have the AIDS virus. 
This prediction would be corroborated by the second 
study). These essential similarities are not the subject of 
the discussion below. Here, I will focus on, and thus 
exaggerate somewhat for illustration, their distinct 
tendencies by which they pull research in different 
directions. (Please see the boxed text for a tutorial on the 
differences between Descriptive Statistics (DS) and 
Inferential Statistics (IS).) 
Considerable differences between the phyla exist and 
have been at center of a broad philosophical war since at 
least the 1930s (discussed below). The current 
predominance of inferential statistics, and specifically the 
methods intended to test a particular hypothesis, owes its 
success to an unfortunately confluence of features, 
practices, and history (6). They include confusion, mis-
teachings, fears of sanctions from editors and others, and 
a capturing of the treasury – referring to the NIH and the 
strings of funding for biomedical science. 
The historical emergence of 
inferential statistics 
In the beginning 
The medical literature arose as case reports and as 
larger studies reported using descriptive statistics. 
Profound qualitative findings were made. Once these 
associations were noted, few numbers or graphs were 
needed to teach the resulting rules of clinical practice. 
Examples follow. 
It was noted that an absence of brain 
activity associated uniformly with lack 
of recovery and eventual whole-body 
death. A still-pumping heart associated 
with both of two contrasting conditions: 
a functioning brain and a nonfunctional 
one. End-of-life clinical decisions are 
made upon such simple associations. A 
legal declaration of death can be based 
on an assessment of brain activity, even 
when the heart is beating. 
The symptoms of acute pulmonary and 
cardiovascular collapse were associated 
with thrombus within the pulmonary 
artery and with deep venous 
thrombosis. Based on these 
associations, the principle emerged of 
anticoagulant treatment given 
presumptively, prior to establishing a 
final diagnosis. 
Metastatic colorectal carcinoma was 
associated with polyps (i.e., adenomas) 
having invasion through the muscularis 
mucosae, but not associated with 
adenomas lacking invasion. Some 
patients can accurately be informed, 
“We are sure that we got it in time”, 
based on such simple associations.  
A detailed example is also instructive. When testing 
the toxicity of imatinib in cell culture, effectiveness at a 
low concentration (1/10 to 1/20 of the typical toxic 
concentration) was associated with leukemic cells having 
the BCR-ABL translocation, but not with cells lacking the 
translocation (7): This was a descriptive association.  
When treating patients using imatinib, success was 
associated with the neoplasms having the BCR-ABL 
translocation or a KIT gene mutation, and not with other 
conditions: This was a descriptive association. In recent-
diagnosis BCR-ABL-positive leukemia, imatinib therapy 
was generally preferred over bone marrow 
transplantation, and this preference could have been in 
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theory proved (i.e., statistically supported) by a 
randomized trial comparing the two therapies: This would 
have been an inferential association. The testing of this 
hypothesis has not yet been done, because bone marrow 
transplantation itself induces mortality in nearly 5%, 
while imatinib has not been associated with early therapy-
induced death: This discrepancy, and the ethical and 
common-sense barriers to such a clinical trial, was 
observed from descriptive statistics. Inference testing may 
someday establish the best situation for use of marrow 
transplant in this setting, but the descriptive statistics will 
set the acceptable boundaries for such a study. 
Starting in about the 1920s 
The basic textbooks in most medical subjects are 
filled predominantly with time-tested facts obtained by 
descriptive statistics. Even in psychology, Piaget and 
Pavlov did not rely on inferential statistics for their major 
discoveries, and Skinner often criticized their use as well 
(6). Starting in about the 1920s, the subtle methods of 
psychology, where effect sizes were often small, 
welcomed new hypersensitive methods to generate 
discoveries of causal relationships. The practice spread to 
the rest of biomedical science. Especially when choosing 
among alternative therapies, it is often considered 
valuable to know whether one therapy might be slightly 
better than another. Thus, in clinical therapeutic trials, 
inferential statistics are generally used when possible. 
Eventual domination by statistical hypothesis 
inference testing 
Most biomedical papers cite a p value or depend 
upon studies having used it, and therefore they use 
inferential statistics. Many also present counts and 
averages, and they therefore use descriptive statistics as 
well. Yet, the former is the zeitgeist of our times. The new 
norm is an expectation that all biomedical science will be 
planned, funded, performed, and reported using 
inferential statistics.  Even when a study of simple causal 
relationships is intended to be exploratory and descriptive, 
the effort can unfortunately be coerced into the mold of 
inferential process.  
Experts have documented this pattern of domination. 
Gigerenzer wrote that textbooks and curricula “almost 
never teach the statistical toolbox, which contains tools 
such as descriptive statistics, Tukey’s exploratory 
methods, Bayesian statistics, Neyman-Pearson decision 
theory and Wald’s sequential analysis” (6). Campbell, in 
his in outgoing remarks as editor of leading psychology 
journal (8), lamented, “One of the most frustrating aspects 
of the journal business is the null hypothesis. It just will 
not go away. Books have been written [but] it is almost 
impossible to drag authors away from their p values...It is 
not uncommon for over half the space in a results section 
to be composed of parentheses inside of which are test 
statistics, degrees of freedom, and p values…Investigators 
must learn to argue for the significance of their results 
without reference to inferential statistics.”  
Descriptive vs inferential statistics: A tutorial 
Definitions 
Descriptive statistics (DS) organizes and summarizes the observations made. It satisfies the broad curiosity driving an 
ongoing study. 
Inferential statistics (IS) attempts to create conclusions that reach beyond the data observed. It satisfies specific questions 
raised prior to the study. 
Their goals differ 
DS has a low reliance on starting premises and permits a quick survey to identify high-magnitude patterns. DS can observe 
new areas of interest as well as pre-existing ones. In a subject area, DS is initially used for exploration; in later stages, it serves to 
corroborate, or sometimes can disprove by a single counterexample. Thus, intuitive predictions are broadly enabled by DS. It 
detects qualitative or quantitative differences when they form obviously distinct patterns.  
In DS, the conclusions are equivalent to the findings. Conclusions are observed. No interpretive errors are possible. In DS, 
any “significance” is recognized from familiar and intuitive rules of logic. DS has low capability to detect differences of low 
magnitude; proposals to use DS indicate minimal desire to uncover subtle findings.  
DS examines even small and unanticipated new categories; categories are not typically subject to much manipulation. To 
encounter biases is expected in early explorations; indeed, their recognition may represent a goal of the research.  
DS describes as many diverse characteristics as possible. Individuals can be grouped to create a logical organization of data, 
but DS also displays individuals freely, in addition to any categories that are used. Thus, DS also detects individuals that are 
exceptions to the larger patterns. 
IS is largely performed by statistical hypothesis inference-testing (terminology suggested by Cohen)(1), a large component 
of which in turn is null-hypothesis testing (NHT). Bayesian statistics is a separate subset of IS. IS infers the likely patterns 
governing the data and answers particular numerical questions established before the study began. 
(Continued) 
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How it happened 
Karl Pearson in 1914 published a table of calculated 
values of probability (“P”) for various random samplings 
from a population (9). Soon afterwards, in the 1920s, 
Ronald Fisher introduced a method by which a P value 
could be used to decide to reject a null hypothesis (10). 
Even as late as 1955 (6), Fisher’s writing about the 
method still envisioned a null hypothesis lacking a 
specified statistical alternative hypothesis and omitting 
the concept of effect sizes. 
Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson (Karl’s son) in 1933 
introduced the use of two hypotheses, with a decision 
criterion to choose among them. They also criticized 
Fisher’s method, in part because of his omission of 
alternative hypotheses. The hybrid of Neyman’s and 
Pearson’s ideas with Fisher’s created the modern mode of 
null-hypothesis testing, although many have written that 
the two theories are logically incompatible (6, 11). 
Goodman wryly noted that by trying to supplant Fisher’s 
P value, Neyman and Pearson unintentionally 
immortalized it (11). 
These decision-based methods are distinct from 
certain other respected theories of statistical analysis, such 
as descriptive statistics, Tukey’s exploratory data 
analysis, and Bayesian statistics. As Tukey stated, “If one 
technique of data analysis were to be exalted above all 
others for its ability to be revealing to the mind in 
connection with each of many different models, there is 
little doubt which one would be chosen. The simple graph 
has brought more information to the data analyst's mind 
than any other device. It specializes in providing 
indications of unexpected phenomena” (12). And in 
Bayesian statistics, the probability of a hypothesis 
becomes altered by the results of an experiment or 
observation; a decision is not inherent to the process. 
Indeed, Goodman noted that when clinical trials are re-
analyzed by Bayesian methods, the initially observed 
differences can often be observed to be untrue (11). 
Mis-teaching helped spread the new inferential 
methods. According to Gigerenzer (6), the most widely 
read textbook in the subject in the 1940s and 1950s was 
Guilford’s Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and 
Education. It contained false statements, such as “If the 
results comes out one way, the hypothesis is probably 
There is a high reliance on the starting premises of the study. IS is used as an intentionally slow roadblock in research so 
that a subtle difference can be appropriately vetted before being adopted as true. Typically, IS aims to disprove a “null” 
hypothesis (“Ho“) established from earlier descriptive studies or theoretical prediction, termed NHT. Less frequently, IS aims to 
decide between hypotheses competing on an even basis. IS is intended to predict an outcome or estimate a frequency within 
quantified limits of accuracy. It is usually used to test quantitative differences. 
In IS, the conclusions are extracted from the findings using the given premises and inferences. Interpretive errors are 
possible. Conclusions are decisions. Low-magnitude differences can earn attention when deemed “statistically significant”. 
“Significance” in IS arises from a numerical result to which is applied a decision rule. Familiar rules of logic may or may not be 
applicable. IS offers the power to detect differences of low magnitude.  
Pre-defined categories are the substrate for IS, categories that have a sufficient size. Ideally, the categories are defined prior 
to study design and data collection. The category assignments are intended to be free of bias owing to prior characterization (i.e., 
familiarity with the categories) and study design (such as randomization of treatment assignments to remove biases in a clinical 
therapeutic trial).  
IS detects characteristics that differ between groups, or that fail to differ adequately. Individuals that differ can be detected, 
but this is usually not the goal. IS will group individuals specifically in order to gain adequate statistical power for a comparison. 
Their fields of use characteristically differ 
Descriptive statistics dominates naturally in the fields of biochemistry, anatomy and developmental biology, molecular and 
genetic pathology, and when reporting events such as accident rates and injuries. DS is a first choice for the qualitative 
interpretation of model systems, such as studies of large deletion mutations in proteins, and transgenic gene-knockout cells and 
animals. DS is highly efficient when developing new technical methods. 
Inferential statistics dominates naturally when comparing therapies, comparing groups for their predicted risks, and in 
behavioral, environmental, and genetic epidemiology, including population studies and pedigree analysis. IS is ideal for 
quantitative interpretation of model systems in which subtle changes are sought – in any field of study.  IS is a valid choice for 
comparing competing technical methods once developed, if it is desired to characterize minor differences. 
The perspective from cognitive evolution  
Descriptive statistics uses categorical data closely suited for use in the minute-by-minute activities of the human brain. 
Using DS in a study is analogous to the highly patterned decision-making behaviors employed while an animal body is in 
motion. Confusion and ambiguity are unwelcome. 
Inferential statistics uses subtle numerical distinctions tied to abstract thought. IS is characteristically performed by the 
human brain when in quiet undistracted contemplation. Confusion and ambiguity can be reasoned away or compartmentalized. 
(Continued) 
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correct, if it comes out another way, the hypothesis is 
probably wrong.” And according to Bakan (13), Fisher in 
1947 falsely stated that his principles were “common to 
all experimentation”. 
At some point, it became common to refer to a 
“statistical association” solely according to its definition 
in inferential statistics. It also became common to refer to 
“predictive statistics” as synonymous with inferential 
statistics. Both, however, are utilities also provided by 
descriptive statistics. 
Confusion played its part. Gigerenzer suggested that 
the typical pattern by which hypotheses are tested, 
irrespective of the many statistical alternatives available, 
is a ritual that requires confusion for its propagation (6). 
Haller and Krauss posed questions to 113 subjects 
comprising statistics teachers (including professors, 
lecturer, teaching assistants) and non-statistics teachers of 
psyschology, and psychology students. The questionnaire 
contained six false statements about what could be 
concluded from a p value. None of the students noticed 
that all statements were wrong.  They had apparently 
learned well from their teachers, because 80% of the 
statistics teachers and 90% of the other teachers answered 
that at least one of the statements was true (6). Similar 
results were also obtained in a separate studies by Oakes 
(6) and by Rosenthal and Gaito (13).  
Fear of sanctions enforced the emerging domination. 
Gigerenzer told the story of an author of a noted statistical 
textbook, whose textbook initially informed readers of 
alternative methods of statistical analysis, but reverted in 
later editions to a single-recipe approach of hypothesis-
testing by p values. When answering Gigerenzer’s 
question of why, the author pointed to “three culprits: his 
fellow researchers, the university administration, and his 
publisher.” The author himself was “a Bayesian”, and yet 
had deleted the chapter on Bayesian statistics. Gigerenzer 
summarized, “He had sacrificed his intellectual integrity 
for success” (6). 
Gigerenzer also cited Geoffrey Loftus, editor of 
Memory and Cognition. Upon taking the editorial 
position, he encouraged the use of descriptive statistics 
and did not demand null-hypothesis testing or decisions 
on hypotheses. Under Loftus, alas, only 6% of articles 
presented descriptive information without any null-
hypothesis testing. Yet, the proportion of articles 
exclusively relying on the testing of the null hypothesis 
decreased from 53% to 32%, and it rose again to 55% 
when he was replaced by another editor who emphasized 
Study planning differs 
In descriptive statistics, planning can often be provisional and intuitive. DS is suitable for an experienced investigator to 
carry out on-the-fly. A null hypothesis is not required, although imprecise hypothetical ideas may properly guide the studies. 
Research planning revolves around the pre-analytic steps: understanding of the question and the likely dominant variable(s), 
sample availability and its annotated information, and a toolbox of valid assays. Whether a study should be worthwhile revolves 
on simple concepts of potential impact, novelty of the subject, feasibility, momentum, and investigator experience. 
In inferential statistics, study planning is not always intuitive and is seldom brief. The necessity for a pre-study plan 
precludes performance on-the-fly. A definitive null hypothesis is routine. Alternative hypotheses may be inferred if not explicitly 
stated. The research plan includes lists of pre-analytic and post-analytic techniques including the precise premises, the study 
design, dominant variable(s), and power estimates. It can be difficult to judge at the time of planning whether an experienced 
investigator has correctly designed a study so as to survive post-publication criticism, due to the many modes of failure 
potentially threatening the study. 
Methods of displaying results differ 
The strictly numerical summary statistics of descriptive statistics can include: counts of subjects, events, and characteristics; 
the mean; measures of spread (standard deviation, quartiles, and confidence intervals relating the observed variation and mean) 
and skew; sensitivity and specificity of associations, odds ratio, simple linear regression, hierarchical clustering, principal 
components analysis, and tables and arrays of statistics. 
The strictly numerical summary statistics of inferential statistics can include: estimated differences in the means or variance 
of compared groups; confidence intervals used to predict future data; p values either uncorrected or corrected for multiple 
comparisons; estimated effect sizes, hazard ratios; correlation; statistical comparison tests based on lifetable analysis; multivariate 
risk analysis; and tables and arrays of such statistics.  
The graphical displays of descriptive statistics focus on the empirical distribution and can include the: scatter/dot/stem-leaf 
plot; box and whisker plot; histogram with error bars; Venn diagram for simple, multivariate, or multidimensional data; time-
based plot of observed and complete survival data; ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve; multidimensional maps; and 
highly clever visual displays. (Some descriptive organizations of data, such as a scatter plot, actually represent pure data. Their 
primary purpose is to allow the eye to see the patterns.)  
The graphical displays of inferential statistics use idealized depictions derived from the real or postulated data, including the: 
power estimate curves for planning future studies; Kaplan-Meier estimator (a plotted survival curve) for observed populations 
having incomplete or censored followup data, or plot of predicted survival curves; and chart annotation to denote which of the 
displayed differences are statistically significant.  
(Continued) 
Kern  6 
 
the usual inferential statistical tests (6).  
Neurosis. Gigerenzer argued that hypothesis testing 
was a form of personal subconscious conflict resolution, 
analogous to a Freudian repetitive behavior, making it 
resistant to logical arguments (6). 
Control of the money. The NIH is the major 
centralized funder for publicly supported biomedical 
research in the United States. The entanglement of 
inferential statistics with the policy-deciding 
administrative centers of the NIH is discussed below. 
Clarifying caveats 
The proper use of inferential statistics is not in 
question, whether in the writings of experts or here. 
Inferential statistics are necessary, for example, to 
conduct multivariate analysis of co-existing risk factors in 
epidemiology, to compare treatments in settings where 
subtle improvements are valued, and to aid hypothesis-
testing study designs by using power estimates, which 
judge the number of subjects or assess the quality of 
pedigrees required to generate usable conclusions. The 
inferential power of Bayesian statistics is often 
appropriate when a hypothesis is being examined, 
although it is not the dominant strain of inferential 
statistics published today. 
The use of falsification as a deductive tool is also not 
in question. Both descriptive and inferential statistics are 
capable of providing scientific falsification of 
hypothetical alternatives. 
The problem under discussion is not that inferential 
statistics and hypothesis testing are employed, nor that 
they are employed too often. The problem is that their use 
has come to displace the proper component of research 
that should be purely exploratory. 
A literature, warning against 
inferential statistics, hypothesis-
testing, power estimates, and the 
premature structuring of metho-
dologic details and conclusions 
As introduced earlier, there is a literature of scientific 
philosophy that warns against unproductive or illogical 
practices. These warnings have been pushed aside by an 
effective campaign of conquest governing the formation 
of conventional research practice. They may be unfamiliar 
to many in the current audience. It might be judicious to 
provide an extensive, rather than brief, sampling.  
Once learned, hypothesis testing based on p values 
led to a burgeoning biomedical literature where most 
reports may now be false. Discoveries providing 
unambiguous signs of progress are still only occasional. 
John Ioannidis explained how the false new “facts” are 
taught using complex numbers and obscure study designs, 
and it is difficult to know just how the results were 
obtained. “Research is not most appropriately represented 
and summarized by p-values, but, unfortunately, there is a 
widespread notion that medical research articles should be 
interpreted based only on p-values.” ”It can be proven that 
most claimed research findings are false” (14). 
BF Skinner  blamed Fisher and his followers for 
having “taught statistics in lieu of scientific method” (6).  
In a popular recent book, Stuart Firestein explained 
that the idea that the scientific method being “one of 
observation, hypothesis, manipulation, further 
observation, and new hypothesis, performed in an endless 
loop…is not entirely true, because it gives the sense that 
this is an orderly process, which it almost never is. ‘Let’s 
“Associations” differ 
In descriptive statistics, “to have an association with” means “to be observed to exist with”. The associations of a given group 
of subjects are independent of the features of any other group; no comparison to another group is required to establish an 
association. For example, fishermen as a group can be associated with the condition “holding fishing poles”, even if no other group 
is studied. 
In DS, frequencies observed in a group of subjects (e.g., the proportion of men wearing red shirts) can be compared to 
independent frequencies obtained from other groups (e.g., women) or from artificial results produced by random assortment (shirts 
of mixed colors are dropped from an imaginary helicopter). These other groups need not be highly matched to the initial group (e.g., 
teachers can be compared to doctors). Such comparisons are not done so as to provide the significance of the frequencies observed, 
but instead are for reference and illustration. DS often uses binary or categorical variables, or continuous variables having natural 
groupings arising from discontinuous or polymodal distributions. 
Associations of interest are generally simple in DS, due to producing practical inferences that are largely intuitive. Pepe noted, 
however, that statistics such as the ROC and odds ratios are not intuitive to most scientists and can produce confusion unless 
compared to reference examples (3). 
In inferential statistics, “to have an association with” means “to be associated preferentially with”. The association must be 
supported by a low p value or other inferential statistic. To observe association in IS requires a comparison between groups. 
In IS, frequencies in a group of subjects (e.g., red shirts in men, again) can be compared to another group (women) known to 
differ by having a nonoverlapping condition (gender). The other group can be real, or can be the frequencies expected under random 
assortment (the helicopter). The purpose of the comparison is to determine the significance of any differences. The matched 
condition or random scenario is not an independent reference, but is integral to the numerical analysis of the first group. 
IS often uses continuous variables measuring small increments of value, which may be transformed to binary or ordinal 
variables (i.e., the variables get “dummied up”) in order to search for associations. Associations (meaning preferences or 
differences) of interest are often subtle or complex, in which the practicality of the inferences can be obscure. 
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get the data, and then we can figure out the hypothesis’ I 
have said to many a student worrying too much about 
how to plan an experiment…Observations, 
measurements, findings, and results accumulate and at 
some point may gel into a fact” (15) . It is the ignorance 
of a subject, along with an interesting means to dispel the 
ignorance, that drives great science. 
“Science advances one funeral at a time”, Max 
Planck is quoted as saying.  Thomas Kuhn expanded on 
the same concept, of why a new paradigm is not 
immediately advanced when a hypothesis is rejected. 
Popular, standardizing hypotheses (paradigms) gain not 
merely a power far in excess of their objective worth, but 
an unjust near-immunity against disproof (4). In 
discussing new facts that ran counter to an existing 
paradigm, Kuhn wrote, “Assimilating a new sort of fact 
demands a more than additive adjustment of theory, and 
until that adjustment is completed – until the scientist has 
learned to see nature in a different way – the new fact is 
not quite a scientific fact at all.”  
David Bakan wrote, “The test of significance does 
not provide the information concerning psychological 
phenomena characteristically attributed to it; and a great 
deal of mischief has been associated with its 
use…publication practices foster the reporting of small 
effects in populations …[this flaw] is, in a certain sense, 
‘what everybody knows.’” The publication of “significant 
results does damage to the scientific enterprise” (13).  
Distinguishing early exploratory data analysis with 
the follow-up use of hypothesis-testing confirmatory 
studies, John Tukey explained, “Unless exploratory data 
analysis uncovers indications, usually quantitative ones, 
there is likely to be nothing for confirmatory data analysis 
to consider…Exploratory data analysis can never be the 
whole story, but nothing else can serve as the foundation 
stone – as the first step.” “Exploratory data analysis 
[looks] at data to see what it seems to say. It concentrates 
on simple arithmetic and easy-to-draw pictures…Its 
concern is with appearance, not with confirmation” (16). 
Regarding a 1970 collation of articles condemning 
null-hypothesis statistical testing (The Significance Test 
Controversy), Jacob Cohen cites (1) contributing author 
Paul Meehl as having randily described the method as “a 
potent but sterile intellectual rake who leaves in his merry 
path a long train of ravished maidens but no viable 
scientific offspring”. Schmidt and Hunter were cited by 
Glaser (17) as having “claimed that the use of 
significance testing actually retards the ongoing 
development of the research enterprise.” Cohen agreed, 
writing, “I argue herein that null-hypothesis statistical 
testing has not only failed to support the advance of 
psychology as a science but also has seriously impeded 
it.” Roger Kirk was quoted to say, “null hypothesis testing 
can actually impede scientific progress” (18). Charles 
Lambdin summarized (18), “Since the 1930s, many of our 
top methodologists have argued that significance tests are 
not conducive to science…If these arguments are sound, 
then the continuing popularity of significance tests in our 
peer-reviewed journals is at best embarrassing and at 
worst intellectually dishonest.” 
Cohen (1) provided a set of short logical puzzles 
illustrating illogical conclusions that can be easy to 
recognize as twisted when placed in familiar situations. 
For example, in an example paraphrased from Pollard and 
Richardson (19): If a person is an American, then he is 
probably not a member of Congress. Yet, we know that a 
particular person is a member of Congress. Therefore, he 
is probably not an American. Note that this ridiculous 
conclusion is nonetheless formally exactly the same as the 
following. If Ho is true, then this result (statistical 
significance) would probably not occur. Yet, the result 
has occurred. Therefore, Ho is probably not true and must 
be formally discarded. The dangers of null-hypothesis 
testing are thus made intuitive by such puzzles. 
Irene Pepperberg (20) wrote, “I’ve begun to rethink 
the way we teach students to engage in scientific research. 
I was trained, as a chemist, to use the classic scientific 
method: devise a testable hypothesis, and then design an 
experiment to see if the hypothesis is correct or not…I’ve 
changed my mind that this is the best way to do 
science…First, and probably most importantly, I’ve 
learned that one often needs simply to sit and observe and 
learn about one’s subject…Second, I’ve learned that truly 
interesting questions really often can’t be reduced to a 
simple testable hypothesis, at least not without being 
somewhat absurd…Third, I’ve learned that the scientific 
community’s emphasis on hypothesis-based research 
leads too many scientists to devise experiments to prove, 
rather than test, their hypotheses. Many journal 
submissions lack any discussion of alternative competing 
hypotheses.” 
Begley and Ellis reported that nearly 90% of pre-
clinical drug studies could not be replicated (21). The 
early benefit of such drug candidates is typically shown 
by quantitative differences (not qualitative findings) 
obtained during hypothesis-based model-testing. I 
recently examined the similarly depressing realization that 
fewer than 1% of new cancer biomarkers enter practical 
use. A common and thus highly expensive cause of failure 
was that the “significant” result from inferential statistics 
was misleading. In contrast, the biomarkers that 
succeeded were often the markers discovered by 
molecular and genetic pathology and employed by 
clinical and surgical pathology laboratories, without 
depending on p values (22). 
The special problem of the p value 
The p value is at center of most applications of 
inferential statistics. Its major problem may be that it is 
not intuitive. Few investigators seem to know what it 
means when it is low; even fewer know what it means 
when it is high. Lambdin said that “the mindless ritual 
Kern  8 
 
significance test is applied by researchers with little 
appreciation of its history and virtually no understanding 
of its actual meaning” (18). 
Well published problems exist and are discussed 
elsewhere in this document. As summarized by Glaser 
(17), “the controversy involves the sole use (and 
misinterpretation) of the P value without taking into 
account other descriptive statistics, such as effect sizes 
and confidence intervals, statistics that provide a broader 
glimpse into the data analysis.” 
Sometimes overlooked, however, are the 
manipulative effects of the p value on scientific goals. 
The p-value mentality reinforces the desire to determine 
precise values. Whether 47% differs from 49% is a 
question demanding a p value. Tukey has been quoted as 
saying, “Far better an approximate answer to the right 
question, which is often vague, than an exact answer to 
the wrong question, which can always be made precise.” 
He was echoing Aristotle’s “It is the mark of an 
educated man to look for precision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits.” An 
example illustrates Tukey’s point. It is far more useful 
now to rapidly observe that a diagnostic marker fails in 
nearly half of the patients, than to use extensive study to 
determine at some later date that the precise failure rate is 
47% or that it definitely fails less often than another 
marker. 
The special problem of conclusions 
The idea that a researcher should draw a conclusion 
is a concept from inferential statistics; it is not from 
descriptive statistics. In descriptive approaches, the data, 
once organized, are the conclusion. 
According to William Rozeboom, the results of 
inferential statistics do not justify a decision point (i.e., a 
conclusion)(23). Rozeboom noted that Bayes theorem 
(which is an inferential technique) inherently abandons 
the goal of making conclusions. “The primary aim of a 
scientific experiment is not to precipitate decisions, but to 
make an appropriate adjustment in the degree to which 
one accepts, or believes, the hypothesis or hypotheses 
being tested.” A confidence interval is a more suitable 
report of the relative confidence in a particular 
hypothesis.  The confidence interval does not involve an 
arbitrary decision (i.e., a conclusion). “Insistence that 
published data must have the biases of the null-hypothesis 
decision built into the report, thus seducing the unwary 
reader into a perhaps highly inappropriate interpretation 
of the data, is a professional disservice of the first 
magnitude.” “Its most basic error lies in mistaking the aim 
of a scientific investigation to be a decision, rather than a 
cognitive evaluation of propositions.” 
Tukey has also been quoted as saying, “The feeling 
of “Give me … the data, and I will tell you what the real 
answer is!” is one we must all fight against again and 
again, and yet again.”  
If investigators indeed generated true conclusions at 
the immediate conclusion of their studies, then research 
articles could be much shorter. No confirmatory studies 
would be justifiable. Science would not be self-correcting, 
it would be infallible. 
Who, then, makes conclusions? Readers and clinical 
practitioners make conclusions. To do so, they sometimes 
remain patient – and use the test of time. 
What can the authors and investigators properly do? 
They muse hypothetically, pursue proposals 
investigatively, suggest interpretations of data, report 
studies, and discover interesting things. They serve as 
advocates for points of view. Many, being professors, 
profess.  
Conclusions also contain the risk of bias. When 
investigators make conclusions after an attempt to prove a 
hypothesis (such as the NIH asserted hypothesis), they 
have acted with bias. Such conclusions need not be 
trusted readily. Kuhn contrasted the suppressive action of 
pre-existing hypotheses, when examining data in order to 
reach a conclusion, with the following alternative. “The 
man who is ignorant of these fields, but who knows what 
it is to be scientific, may legitimately reach any one of a 
number of incompatible conclusions” (2). Retaining an 
open-minded legitimacy would foster innovation. 
The special problem of power estimates 
Power estimates are required in some settings. “If 
you plan to use inferential statistics…to analyze your 
evaluation results, you should first conduct a power 
analysis to determine what size sample you will need” 
(24). 
In practical use, pre-test power estimation requires 
knowing the following. 
 Your subject, well enough to have 
settled on a firm hypothesis and, 
ideally, at least one alternate 
hypothesis. 
 The relevant sample size. Not all 
samples will be relevant to every 
statistical comparison. 
 The proportion of the sample 
belonging to each category. These 
categories will then be compared 
by inferential methods. 
 The effect size (the degree by 
which the dependent variable 
differs) that is anticipated between 
the categories (which are 
distinguished according to the 
independent variable). 
 The practical value of various 
effect sizes. 
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 The difficulty of gathering samples, 
of ensuring adequate representation 
in each category, and of the 
feasibility to perform the 
intervention (a treatment, or an 
assay) on all of the samples. 
 The desired alpha and beta values. 
These are threshold false-positive 
rate under the null hypothesis, and 
threshold false-negative results 
under an incorrect null hypothesis, 
respectively, for the study. 
When a power estimate is needed, should it be 
performed? Maybe not, or maybe it can’t - yet. Only 
when and if the required pre-test knowledge is present 
(see above) can the final power estimation be provided.  
The presumed effect sizes, upon which power 
estimates depend, are themselves often biased, even when 
the effect size is based on published data from an 
influential scientific report (25). 
For many types of research, such as molecular 
pathology, biochemistry, or developmental biology, an 
expectation or demand that all investigators must provide 
power estimates, prior to initiating a study, is assured to 
hamper selectively these particular fields. This should be 
self-evident; the nature of these fields is to explore areas 
as-yet unknown, in which the requirements for a power 
estimate can never be met. More subtle, however, is the 
destructive effects on other fields, even those relying 
appropriately upon inferential statistics, because many of 
the initial explorations in such fields will themselves 
depend upon employing descriptive approaches to 
generate their fresh ideas and momentum.  
Merely to discuss power estimates can be a sign of 
unfamiliarity with simple statistics. Here, we can explore 
the underlying behaviors of group numbers, from which 
one can judge the utility of power estimates. Once the 
study population surpasses 100 samples, and certainly by 
1000 samples, the relevance of the power estimate is 
essentially nil. At high sample numbers, the chance of 
discovering a meaningless or unconfirmable difference, 
using inferential statistics, approaches 100% for all 
comparisons pursued.  Notably, the first published 
criticism of Fisher’s method of determining statistical 
significance was in 1938. Joseph Berkson noted that p 
values systematically became ridiculously small when the 
number of samples was large; thus, decisions on 
“significance” were produced, even when nothing of 
interest was being observed (26). 
As an example, let us imagine 100 samples, 40% of 
which belong to the first of two mutually exclusive 
categories. We further stipulate that the association is an 
exclusive one due to a causal genotype-phenotype 
association (e.g., if each of 40 patients having a mutation 
in a given gene were found to have schizophrenia, and the 
remaining 60 patients having a wildtype gene were not), 
then the two-tailed Fisher exact test would yield p <10-28. 
Even if the association were not exclusive but was barely 
at the threshold of clinical interest (as might be the case if 
80% of the first group and 20% of the second had a 
particular feature), the p value would still be vanishingly 
low, at <10-8. The p values would not greatly change their 
meaning if the proportions of the two groups began to 
deviate yet more from each other; this is because 
vanishingly low p values all convey the same meaning. 
Even were the first group to have only 10% of the 
subjects, the p value of the 80:20 difference just described 
would still be <.001 for the 100 samples. 
The only purpose to discussing power estimates in 
planning or evaluating such a study exists when there is 
enthusiasm in finding minor differences between the 
groups and when there is also the opportunity to increase 
the sample sizes. Minor differences, such as two groups 
respectively having 45% and 65% prevalence of the 
detected feature, have little utility in molecular pathology, 
in developmental biology, or in many other biomedical 
fields. And for many initial scientific explorations, 
increasing the sample size may be prohibitively difficult 
or may not satisfy the cost/benefit consideration. 
Relatively unbiased, consecutively obtained, sample sets 
are discrete entities having a given size. They cannot be 
expanded on demand. It would often be preferable to 
explore the existing large sample set, to report the results, 
and to set aside the inferential studies until followup 
efforts to be conducted at a later date. 
By this line of analysis, one may realize that in 
common situations existing in many fields of science, the 
mere discussion of power estimates can be a sign of 
naiveté, like a beginner without chops sitting in on a hot 
jam session.  
When can the issue of a power estimate be raised? It 
should be considered when a particular hypothesis is 
proposed and the hypothesis envisions detecting 
differences (effect sizes) that are subtle, given the number 
of samples.  
The special problem of study planning 
Descriptive and inferential efforts differ. To plan the 
course of future years of inferential science requires many 
of the same foundations as does the procedure of power 
estimation. Given the requisite pieces, investigational 
plans tightly tied to specific hypotheses can be assembled 
into a formal list of procedures and rules for making 
decisions (conclusions). These lists readily construct a 
rigid, multi-year research design for future work. 
In contrast, descriptive explorations do not require 
formal hypotheses, estimates of effect sizes, or any 
particular number of samples. In general, having a large 
number of available techniques and samples permits the 
greatest freedom for the anticipated exploratory efforts. 
Yet, even more important are a capable investigator team 
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and a fresh subject area. An appropriate multi-year 
research design in exploratory efforts would list the 
divisions of the subject area intended for study, along 
with the general means for producing any unusual novel 
capabilities or datasets needed. Given the freshness of the 
field, even the methods may change monthly as these 
novel investigations, capabilities, and datasets find the 
pathways of least resistance. 
As an example, the discovery of the double-helical 
structure of DNA by Watson and Crick had a well 
documented history. After long efforts and little progress, 
their methods were abruptly changed to seek a path of 
lesser resistance. This change was occasioned by a new 
type of data (x-ray diffraction) and advances in model-
building. The change enabled rather rapid resolution of 
the problem.  
The biomedical literature is replete with examples of 
notable discoveries that arose not from long-planned 
experiments, but from serendipity during a productive 
series of limited-duration exploratory efforts. This is 
sometimes referred to as beginner’s luck, but actually 
reflects a predictable property in which the low-hanging 
fruit in a field is picked by the early, fastest-moving 
entrants. Such discoveries are antithetical to the delayed, 
routine testing of well-defined hypotheses. 
It is conventional to demand detailed planning prior 
to funding a research effort. This creates a strong bias 
favoring inferential efforts. In the published guidelines 
governing multi-year research funding, requirements for a 
long-range detailed plan are common. Such a plan is 
suitable for well-known subjects and confirmatory efforts. 
Yet, these expectations come with a high price: they will 
systematically discriminate against exploratory 
examinations of fresh subject areas. 
By extension of this argument, the more 
methodologically detailed are the expectations for long-
range planning, the more biased the research-funding 
enterprise becomes against fast-moving explorations. 
Efficient exploratory research requires a subject area, a 
thematic goal, momentum, and investigator skills. It also 
requires the freedom to test and discard methods rapidly, 
change direction according to the lines of least resistance, 
and make on-the-fly decisions as to the importance of 
fresh data. Exploratory research is an animal body in 
motion. It requires a matched cognitive tool, provided by 
descriptive statistics. 
In order to meet requirements for detailed 
methodological study designs, exploratory efforts must 
either abandon rapid innovation and descriptive statistics, 
or must cloak all proposals in the foreign language of 
inferential, hypothesis-based science. 
Alternatives that miss the target 
Is it not that the real problem is “significance”, or 
lack thereof? Significance is the opposite of 
insignificance, and innovation raises the significance of 
research. Let us, however, introduce some precision. In 
biomedicine, the significance of a discovery could refer to 
one of two types: 1) A discovery serving as a foundational 
fact on which to build a framework of understanding, 
such as the type of facts found in a beginning textbook of 
a subject, or 2) A new fact governing changes in the 
clinical decision-making regarding diagnosis or 
management. Yet, one could imagine remarkable 
innovation that was not immediately recognized as 
significant, or non-innovative confirmatory research that 
had high clinical significance. Worsening the priority for 
“significance”, biomedical researchers are not 
philosophers. They hold to few rules regarding precise 
language, using the word “significance” as a leaf “uses” a 
stormy wind. Significance in such a linguistic wind can 
refer to the subject of study (disease is always a 
significant subject!), to the investment anticipated (to 
spend money and years is certainly a significant effort!), 
or to our nemesis, inferential statistical significance 
(where a low p value conveys significance by definition!). 
No, significance cannot be the key to innovation. 
Is not the real problem “novelty”, or lack thereof? Of 
course, novelty is fine, but to define innovation by its 
novelty is a tautology. And “novelty” is not as stringent a 
term as is “innovation”.  The NIH has even defined 
“novelty” as a grant-scoring criterion fully satisfied by the 
anticipation of “clinical usefulness”, even when an 
approach is confirmatory and incremental (see below). 
This was an appropriate kludge, for “novelty” is irrelevant 
to many well established clinical research problems and 
has no business being a general criterion for judging 
biomedical research. Research has two valid directions: 
innovation, and its opposite. The problem is perceived 
unmistakably only through the lenses of statistical phyla. 
A study, formally designed employing power estimates, 
intended to reach conclusions through inferential 
statistics, and however useful --- is the opposite approach; 
innovation cannot emerge there except by serendipity.  
Is not the problem “confirmatory” research? 
“Confirmatory data analysis” was the term used by 
Tukey, distinguishing “exploratory data analysis” from 
the followup studies initiated later. Most biomedical 
scientists, however, no doubt believe that their formal 
plans to use inferential statistics will lead to novel 
findings, usefulness that was unanticipated, and other 
valuable outcomes. And as with “significance” and 
“novelty”, “confirmation” is an ambiguous term that can 
sometimes refer to a strict attempt to replicate a prior 
finding. We can avoid this linguistic confusion by using 
an operational definition instead. Innovation is opposed 
when a research proposal involves a compulsory study 
design optimized using power estimates and when 
inferential statistics will be used to make conclusions. If a 
word search, performed on a document evaluating a 
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research direction, contains the words “hypothesis”, 
“power”, “design”, or “conclusion”, anxiety intensifies 
concerning the survival of innovation. 
Finally, could it not be that the real barrier is 
“incrementalism”? To have “increments” requires that the 
research direction be previously established, a bias against 
innovation. And large-magnitude advances are more 
likely to belie true innovation than are small differences.  
Yet, to effectively label using the pejorative term 
“incrementalism” implies that scientists could agree how 
small is undesirably small and could recognize that even 
large increments might exclude innovation. If career 
scientists tend to agree on one thing, it is that they cannot 
agree on much at all. Grades of importance, of novelty, of 
significance, and what can be termed as incremental do 
not lend themselves to agreement except when re-
examined comfortably later through historical hindsight. 
Hindsight is not an appropriate discriminator for 
innovative research planning, however. Instead, one could 
focus on the toolbox brought to the research work site. If 
the incrementalist’s toolbox were packed with formal 
multiyear designs, power estimates, and plans for 
inferential statistics, the research will be systematically 
oriented towards strongly pre-established directions and 
likely will be incompatible with exploratory innovation. 
This toolbox is objectively recognizable, while judgments 
of incrementalism are not. 
And so, the difficulty lies in more than a word or a 
quality. Inferential statistics for many researchers 
represents the bindings of their training. It is their world. 
They feel uncomfortable in an alternate universe; they 
react in alarm when they perceive that others intend to 
work there. During their training, typical investigators 
have successfully excluded the null hypothesis multiple 
times. Most, however, have never uncovered a really 
zesty innovation. Many are fully capable of doing on-the-
fly exploration and would dream of having the chance. 
Yet, the ubiquitous research constraints of inferential 
statistics compel them to self-censure, to feel that it must 
be improper. As Kuhn explained (4), “What questions 
may legitimately be asked… and what techniques 
employed in seeking solutions? [The answers] are firmly 
embedded in the educational initiation that prepares and 
licenses the student for professional practice. Because that 
education is both rigorous and rigid, these answers come 
to exert a deep hold on the scientific mind.”  
To employ a different metaphor, inferential statistics 
is a permission slip flashed by incremental, confirmatory, 
hypothesis-burdened, over-designed research in search of 
small-magnitude differences. Given a plausible prediction 
of the effect size, adequate sample numbers, and a model 
that limits extraneous variables, its power estimates will 
indicate promise and convey credibility to the project. 
Years in advance of analyzing the observed data, the 
projected p values will already elicit approbation. By 
contrast, in a competitive environment of research 
funding, exploratory research, upon request, 
systematically fails to produce the permission slip. 
Publicly funded research efforts become systematically 
deprived of a healthy discovery pipeline… except, 
perhaps, when the discovery pipeline is highly focused, 
formally designed, administratively sanctioned, and 
nearly indistinguishable from hypothesis-testing research. 
Human genome sequencing and transcriptome profiling 
research was of this latter sanctioned approach.  
The problem appeared to be of large magnitude, of 
importance, of significance. And it was publicly 
recognized, repeatedly. After decades of skirmishes, a 
prescient and blunt analysis was published in three 
documents by a notable panel of NIH-selected biomedical 
research experts. And what happened? 
Policies of the Funding Source 
Based on documents of self-critique cited below, the 
NIH took sides in this philosophical civil war, often and 
explicitly choosing hypothesis testing as its sole launch 
vehicle for projects in both new and established scientific 
fields. For decades, the NIH solicitations for funding 
applications proffered guidelines along the lines of “This 
program will fund hypothesis-based initiates to study…” 
or, “This program aims to fund careers of young 
investigators who will pursue hypothesis-based 
inquiry…” The agency handbooks for grant applications 
instructed applicants in essence to “State your hypothesis, 
and propose your plan for establishing its validity.” 
Inferential science in NIH funding decisions, a 
problem of logic 
Throughout scientific history, the hypothesis was a 
welcome tool, a friend. An expert in a subject could 
embark on hypothetical musings, entertaining and 
discarding them freely as one would collect pretty stones 
on a stream bank. Or, an open-ended hypothesis could 
guide the research productively for years. 
The NIH reinvented the hypothesis. As an NIH panel 
reported in 2000 (27, 28), “peer review of NIH research 
grants has traditionally emphasized the testing of 
hypotheses…the practice of many NIH study sections has 
been to interpret it narrowly as a formal exercise in the 
proposal and proof of a well circumscribed idea. Under 
these conditions, exploratory research…and opportunities 
for generating new knowledge and ideas are thereby lost. 
Such an exclusionary insistence on hypothesis-driven 
research can impede the ability of NIH to accomplish its 
broader charge.” 
The NIH hypothesis thus evolved into a succinct 
semantic trap, a ratchet closing ever tighter. Once a 
subject area had been defined, the investigator was to 
proffer a fundamental hypothesis that was increasingly 
valued the more it was persuasive. Specific Aims were 
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expected to adhere to a coherent attempt to support the 
hypothesis. A proposal that did not satisfactorily assure 
that the hypothesis could become “established” within the 
scope of the research plan was treated with deprecation. 
In this manner, the concept of a guiding hypothesis 
was suppressed. An unprovable, speculative, or imprecise 
hypothesis became unwelcome in the scientific toolkit.  
For example, imagine the following imprecise 
hypothetical foundation for a research project: “Tumors 
of the organ of Zunkerkandl had been seldom studied due 
to their rarity. We now have a superb collection, the first 
in the world. We propose that if we examine them in a 
variety of ways, using experts capable in tumor 
explorations, and taking advantage of our recently 
published techniques and the technical advances to 
emerge in the next few years, we will probably find some 
fresh new ideas about cancer.” In the viewpoint of the 
NIH panel, the classical NIH system might be expected to 
object, “We don’t see how you are going to prioritize the 
research. How do you plan to prove this particular 
hypothesis?”  
The NIH “asserted hypothesis” is a distinctive one. It 
does not serve the same role as a classical null hypothesis, 
or the role of an imprecise guiding hypothesis.  
The field of statistics has previously discussed the 
problems of the solitary hypothesis. For example, 
Gigerenzer warned against the “null ritual” in which only 
a null hypothesis is established, but not any alternative 
hypothesis (6). This warning, however, was directed at a 
true null hypothesis intended to be discarded, one that the 
investigators did not hold as their own hypothesis. The 
earlier 1938 warning from Berkson was different (26). 
Berkson noted that one must 1) have an alternative 
hypothesis and 2) be free to accept it. He wrote, “There is 
never any valid reason for rejection of the null hypothesis 
except on the willingness to embrace an alternative one”.  
Except in the formal setting of clinical trial planning, 
NIH instructions on how to propose a hypothesis typically 
omit the null hypothesis, the complementary alternate 
hypothesis (-ses), and the classical attempt to disprove the 
former. Instead, one is expected to proffer a positive 
hypothesis to which one is already firmly committed, in 
order to prove it true with yet more accumulated support. 
It is asserted in essence to be “pre-true”, requiring only 
additional study to be proved. 
In the field of rhetoric, the NIH asserted hypothesis is 
classified as a logical flaw termed “privileging the 
hypothesis”. By assembling evidence towards a certain 
favored hypothesis, small degrees of favorable evidence 
become overemphasized, the evidence in favor of 
competing hypotheses escapes attention, and evidence 
potentially opposing the asserted hypothesis is not sought. 
That is, there is a bias towards cherry-picking both the 
investigations and the data. 
In an epistemologic theory popularized by Karl 
Popper, the only manner in which to prove a hypothesis 
true is by deductive logic, in which all competing 
hypotheses are considered and disproved by empirical 
falsification. The interpretations obtained under either 
descriptive or inferential statistics are scientific theories, 
i.e., they meet Popper’s requirement for falsifiability (29). 
These and other asserted hypotheses are actually well 
represented in the philosophical writings of Kuhn and 
Popper.  
The NIH asserted hypothesis is typically intended to 
be validated by inductive logic. Inductive approaches 
were criticized by Popper as being non-scientific (2), “I 
should still contend that a principle of induction is super-
fluous, and that is must lead to logical inconsistencies.” 
Inductive logic supports a hypothesis by assembling a set 
of facts that are consistent with the hypothesis being true, 
but are not necessarily inconsistent with its being untrue. 
The NIH-style asserted hypothesis is generally not 
represented in the theoretical statistical literature, perhaps 
owing to its peculiar features, which include: 1) It does 
not rely upon a deductive falsification approach, whereby 
a given hypothesis is tested in an attempt to demonstrate it 
to be false. Instead, it is an inductive approach. 2) For 
there to exist a robust procedure, by which to fairly test a 
declared bias, is inherently illogical and self-
contradictory. 3) Any flexibility of the investigator to 
accept an alternative hypothesis is often considered a 
weakness according to the NIH model for asserted 
hypotheses. 
The cost to this logical flaw is that investments come 
to be made that neither will prove nor disprove the 
asserted hypothesis. When investigating a popular 
hypothesis, the research will, in the NIH model, bestow 
on it a patina of proof, logically unsound but now socially 
fixed. 
NIH intentions to reform on the issue of the hypothesis 
The NIH noted that the needs of biomedical science 
were not being met. The NIH Panel of Scientific 
Boundaries for Review was organized in 1998. In the 
Executive Summary of its phase 1 report of January 2000, 
the report addressed the cultural war on descriptive 
science and the pedantic methodologic detail often 
demanded by the reviewers (27, 28).  In its paragraph on 
new cultural norms recommended for adoption by NIH, it 
included the following.  Advocacy for a particular “style 
of research” was not to be the role of a peer reviewer. The 
research proposed should be judged “without undue 
emphasis on minor technical details”. It pointedly warned, 
“if NIH is to accomplish its full mission, applications that 
propose exploratory research and methods development, 
in addition to those that propose hypothesis-driven 
research, must be judged on their potential…impact”. It 
cautioned that an effort must be made not to discriminate 
“against bold new ideas.” In the later detailed sections, 
the report again emphasized that “all research styles must 
be judged on their potential” and that “both hypothesis-
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driven and exploratory research should be judged on their 
merits and promise.” The problem had been diagnosed, 
publicized, and a treatment plan recommended. 
For NIH grant applications submitted after January 
25, 2010, the center in charge of most initial scientific 
peer review (CSR) revamped the written review and 
scoring system to address the new priorities as part of a 
set of enhancements to the NIH peer review system. To 
downplay a prior over-emphasis on formal hypothesis-
testing, the CSR in their “Advice to Investigators 
Submitting Clinical Research Applications” currently 
states an even-handed choice, “Clearly articulate the 
hypotheses or [emphasis added] objectives and specific 
aims of the study” (30). 
The NIH advises reform on other issues pertinent to 
exploratory science 
The NIH panel report also highlighted the need to 
downplay the recitation of details in the research plan, in 
which the routines of inferential statistics and conclusion-
drawing are described in multiple pages. This recitation of 
details had served to illuminate inferential science in the 
best possible light, while placing exploratory approaches 
in a most unflattering glare during grant review. 
The notices published by the NIH have also echoed 
the concern. Notice NOT-OD-07-014 in 2006 (31), for 
example, suggested, “NIH peer review could be improved 
by focusing less on experimental details and more on key 
ideas and the scientific significance of proposed projects.” 
It predicted that an improved peer review system could 
benefit by “shortening the Research Plan section and 
focusing it more on ideas and significance”. 
Examples will be familiar to investigators, but 
publically available examples are infrequent due to 
privacy concerns. An illustration from 2002 was 
available, however. The examples of reviewer comments 
at CSR’s website (32) include multiple instances of the 
reviewers suggesting specific research details, even 
specific reagents, often followed by coercive phrases such 
as “[my own personal favorite method] might be a useful 
addition to these studies/protocols” or “[my own personal 
favorite method] is not included as an experimental 
technique in this proposal, but could be used.” The same 
examples contained the familiar demand for power 
estimates. One review described the applicant’s complex 
set of exploratory experiments, laboriously described in 
detail, yet “with no mention of power calculations to 
assure statistical validity of these choices”. Note the 
demand for power estimates in an exploratory study. 
In the re-vampment of peer review (NIH 2008 notice 
NOT-OD-09-025)(33), the prior single section of the 
grant application termed “Background and Significance” 
section was re-oriented into separate sections of 
Significance and Novelty. A new Approach section was 
created to encompass the prior sections of Preliminary 
Data and of Research Design and Methods. The Approach 
section was segregated away from other sections to aid 
the separate scoring of the Approach criterion. Reviewers 
were to “give a separate score for each” criterion, which 
in a 2007 NIH Peer Review report (34) were designed to 
“rate multiple, explicit criteria individually”, and were 
announced in the 2008 notice to have non-overlapping 
scorable components. 
The year 2000 panel report also advised that the 
overall peer review evaluation of the application should 
pay “close attention to potential impact and the quality of 
the investigator without undue emphasis on minor 
technical details.” It pointedly criticized peer reviewers, 
emphasizing that they “should not be in the business of 
designing their next experiments” (27, 28).  To downplay 
the prior overemphasis on methodologic detail, both 
applicants and reviewers currently receive written 
instructions from CSR that the design of the Approach 
was to entail both the preliminary data and multiple listed 
categories for review, including the rationale for the 
design, the feasibility of the methods incorporated into the 
design (generally evidenced by the preliminary data, 
which serve as tutorials in how interpretations or 
conclusions are drawn from the assays), a list of studies to 
be performed, and the management of possible 
difficulties. 
The Preliminary Data section was apparently 
incorporated into the new, shortened Approach section in 
order to enforce changes in what the Panel felt was “an 
obsession with preliminary data” among reviewers (27). 
The panel report instructed, “for new ideas, little or no 
preliminary data may be required.” 
Novelty was supported in the panel report where it 
described that “the present system tends to discourage 
risk-taking and to undervalue new ideas. We urge that 
reviewers endorse the importance of ideas that are 
original and have yet to be tried.” Novelty was to be 
judged on the novel direction or, alternately for important 
yet incremental clinical advances, on the “usefulness” of a 
proposed clinical development. In context, the report 
indicated that the novelty could derive solely from the 
direction and goal, and not necessarily from the particular 
methods to be used (35). As with the other recommended 
changes, these changes were highly sympathetic to the 
needs of exploratory research.  
The section of applications devoted to the Research 
Proposal was shortened from 25 to 12 pages for grants of 
the R01 (the major independent research grant) type. This 
also was intended to reduce distraction by reviewers and 
applicants by methodologic details and permit more 
emphasis on Significance and Novelty. In the past, NIH 
had recommended to applicants to devote about 13-16 of 
their 25 pages on the Research Design and Methods (NIH 
notice NOT-OD-06-014). With the new application 
format, the same NIH notice anticipated that the new 
methods section might occupy only half the pages 
allowed in new-style applications. The page-reduction 
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would then result in a methodologically trim listing of 
anticipated studies in place of the prior detail, to reduce 
the opportunity for methodologic distraction. As stated in 
an NIH tutorial video introducing the new peer review 
system (36), a goal of the changes was “reducing the 
volume of technical details, and by increasing review 
focus on the importance of the projects”. The 2007 NIH 
Peer Review report (34) stated the goal to be “to reduce 
application length to focus on impact and 
uniqueness/originality, placing less emphasis on standard 
methodological details.” 
Failure to align the NIH with the recommendations 
Despite the laudable intentions of NIH reformers, the 
written evidence shows that administrators in the NIH’s 
institutes did not systematically implement the Panel’s 
year 2000 recommendations. NIH leaders of medical 
institutes did not issue clear guidelines to address the 
concerns identified. The evidence exists in the documents 
written by administrators and posted publicly. Advocacy 
continued for particular styles of research over other valid 
styles. For example, requirements for formalized 
hypothesis-testing continued to be instituted in new 
programs initiated by program administrators in multiple 
institutes. 
The model application to be followed by 
NHLBI/NIH applicants for a K08 Mentored Clinical 
Scientist Career Development Award specifies that the 
first page of the Research Plan must be a “Statement of 
Hypothesis and Specific Aims” (37). The K12 Career 
Development Award for Clinical Oncology supports 
careers intended to “perform clinical oncology therapeutic 
research that develops and tests scientific hypotheses 
based on fundamental and clinical research findings; (2) 
design and test hypothesis-based clinical therapeutic 
protocols and adjunct biological analyses” (38).  
The NIAID instructs applicants that “Most NIH-
funded research is hypothesis driven. State your 
hypothesis in your abstract and Research Plan” (39). One 
might wonder, and what if the year 2000 panel 
recommendations were followed instead? 
Under the re-vampment, the usage of power 
estimates was not revised to become more appropriate. 
Their use is still advised indiscriminately by the NIH 
system. In an NIH grant solicitation aimed to find 
interactions among social, behavioral, and genetic factors 
(40), the administrators must have resigned themselves to 
the sad expectation that the grantees would be 
energetically searching for small differences, the type of 
studies that led the field of psychology to jump so 
enthusiastically on the p value bandwagon. This grant 
solicitation required “power analyses to prove the sample 
sizes are sufficient for analysis of the interactions being 
studied.“ In other endeavors it can, however, be 
ambiguous semantically whether power estimates are 
truly required in an NIH proposal. For example, the NIH 
October 2011 Guidelines for NCI Program Project (PO1) 
Grants (41) (a large grant program) instructs PO1 
applicants how to meet the requirements for the Human 
Subjects section. Among the five sentences of instruction 
is the reminder, “Power calculations justifying the number 
of subjects required for the proposed studies, and plans 
for recruitment and retention of subjects are appropriate 
for inclusion”. In the Vertebrate Animals instructional 
section, a cursory three sentences includes the reminder 
that “power calculations justifying the number of animals 
required are appropriate for inclusion”. Again, one 
wonders; might they not also be appropriate for 
exclusion? 
The resistance to rehabilitation also extended to the 
peer-review process and the NIH peer-review center, 
CSR. Evidence appears lacking that grant review or 
programmatic funding decisions now place less emphasis 
on hypothesis testing and methodologic detail and more 
on significance, novelty, and momentum than before the 
redesign. As in the past, reviewers today remain free to 
weight-as-they-choose the new categories of Significance, 
Innovation, and Investigator(s), and are permitted to re-
emphasize the rote formalities of methodologic detail. 
Formal evidence for this resistance is found in the 
criteria for which an applicant may appeal their grant 
reviews. Allowable appeals must allege the review panel 
to have a lack of expertise or bias/conflicts of interest, or 
allege major errors of scientific fact (Appeals of NIH 
Initial Peer Review, NOT-OD-11-064)(42). The 
discrepancies between the long list of revamped review 
guidelines (2012 CSR Reviewer Guidelines and Details of 
Application Changes for Research Grants and 
Cooperative Agreements of May 20, 2010) (35, 43) show 
that deviations from the goals of the Panel’s report 
(deviations such as an imposed requirement for formally 
testing an NIH-style asserted hypothesis, or requiring 
power estimates for early exploratory studies) were not 
adopted in the revampment as grounds for appeal. 
Reviewers are also still permitted to view the detailed 
research plan as a determinant of the proposal’s 
significance and novelty, rather than as a separate 
criterion for evaluation. 
As documented above in examples, grant review 
criteria previously could exclude exploratory proposals by 
requiring hypotheses, power estimates, and prescriptive 
study design. After the revampment, criteria biased in 
favor of the incremental discovery of pre-conceived 
distinctions continued to be acceptable in grant review. 
Casual observers may not be aware of the blatant 
openness of the philosophical battles over power 
estimates and inferential statistics waged during grant 
review at the NIH, and thus may not appreciate its effects 
to limit exploratory science in under-studied areas of 
biomedical sciences. For example, in a biomedical grant 
proposal reviewed in 2012 by NIH’s CSR (44), the 
applicant proposed studies of a subject (the possible 
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function of a novel gene), in which the statistical sections 
of the application expressly proposed to employ 
descriptive statistics to the exclusion of inferential 
statistics, explaining, “We should note that we are not 
interested in having a high power to detect subtle 
differences… we are looking for fundamental distinctions 
and natural separations of the data.” The official review of 
the proposal, in a document issued by CSR, protested this 
approach, requesting new “power calculations performed” 
and stipulated a new research goal “to obtain statistically 
significant results such that even minimal associations 
will be made.”  
The NINDS warns applicants of the “Eight basic 
questions reviewers ask”, one of which is “Is the 
hypothesis valid and have you presented evidence 
supporting it?” (45). Yet, decades of writers have 
suggested, might not the testing of a valid hypothesis 
itself be criticized? Why test valid hypotheses, when more 
novel areas beckon?  
Over the past decade, even the initiatives intended to 
fund descriptive and anatomic science (such as the -omic 
anatomy of diseases) have been couched in the language 
of inferential statistics. Certain administratively 
sanctioned categories of descriptive science became 
renamed “hypothesis-generating science” to stand 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the “hypothesis-testing” 
expected of other approaches. In the eyes of the new NIH 
review system, an intriguing exploratory excursion must 
still be clad in the robes of formal and methodologically-
encased hypothesis-spun cloth.  
In such ways, the statistical battles of the 1930s 
revisit the current day, but with an unfair institutional 
advantage favoring one side.  
In summary, despite the revampment at CSR, the 
NIH today often overtly leans towards hypothesis-testing 
science and inferential statistics. This stance can displace 
exploratory science and the attendant descriptive 
statistical approaches. This tendency is most harmful to 
under-served research subjects in which the exploratory 
data do not yet exist to support confirmatory study 
designs. From the panel’s statements, and from the 
perspective of a broad scientific literature, the continued 
deference towards inferential statistics, power estimates, 
and detailed study design continues to shortchange 
biomedical progress. 
Possible benefits from reform 
Through displacement, systematic preferences for 
inferential statistics can cull and replace valuable 
components of a research program, whether local, 
national, or international. A forceful reversal is advised 
for the perniciously harmful encroachment of inferential 
formalism into our research goals, into peer-review, into 
funding decisions, and into study designs. Low-impact, 
low-efficiency, low-speed research programs could be re-
oriented into more fruitful efforts. 
What level of improvement could be expected in 
research productivity from such re-orienting? Measures of 
improvement would depend on the productivity cost 
currently being borne due to excessive inferential 
formalism and on the ability to redirect efforts into 
exploratory research based upon descriptive statistics. 
One would need to consider assigning: 
 An estimate of the current 
fraction of efforts devoted to 
exploratory approaches 
 An estimate of the current 
fraction of high-impact 
clinically valuable research 
derived specifically from 
exploratory approaches 
 The possible degree by which 
efforts could be re-purposed 
towards research grounded in 
exploratory efforts 
Such numbers are not known, but estimates will 
explore these concepts. Let us stipulate, for sake of 
argument, that current efforts towards descriptive 
approaches and qualitative discoveries constitute a 
minority of the research portfolio and yet yield the 
majority of high-impact discoveries. Under these 
premises, the rate of high-impact discoveries would rise 
considerably if the formalities of hypothesis-based 
inferential science were loosened. This rise in output 
would manifest over some time, as investigators began 
first to engage in, then harvest from the new research 
directions and practices. 
Recommendations 
We should re-orient biomedical research towards a 
balance of approaches in which descriptive statistics and 
qualitative differences play prominent roles. 
The above history reveals that the constraints on 
innovative research are not merely matters of judgment 
and preference. The cited documents illustrate that a 
recognizable subset of administrative procedures, 
announcements, grant scoring criteria, and appeal criteria 
operate to set the conditions. Operational definitions can 
measure and document these policies. The resulting 
metrics would permit agencies to monitor the biases 
towards inferential statistics, power estimates, and 
prescriptive study design in most externally funded 
biomedical research. Using these same analytical tools, 
we should argue, we produce tangible means to overcome 
the institutional biases against exploratory research. 
But do inferential statistics constrain research, or do 
people constrain research? Any corrective actions should 
be directed to the influential persons. Suggestions for 
remediation follow. 
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 In the teaching of biomedical statistics, to devote 
adequate weight to the role of descriptive 
statistics. Among three general biostatistical 
texts on my bookshelf, none devoted more than a 
page or two to the subject. Inferential statistics, 
no doubt, deserves more instructional time and 
textbook space owing to its greater complexity 
and to its role in therapeutic development. 
Insufficient attention, however, is given to 
simple associations, their clinical impact and 
their importance to practical daily decision-
making. 
 To instruct researchers on the appropriate role of 
each type of statistical analysis. This must go 
beyond merely warning authors about the danger 
of the p value. The boxed text suggests goals for 
such instruction. 
 To instruct authors, editors, and peer reviewers 
that writing about a hypothesis mandates that the 
merits of the alternative hypotheses must also be 
explained proportionately. 
 To instruct decision-makers at funding agencies 
in the inherent distinctions between descriptive 
and inferential discoveries and how an improved 
recognition of their distinctive differences would 
promote overall research impact. 
 To study and report summary statistics as to 
what fraction of grant funds are awarded for each 
of the two statistical phyla: descriptive and 
inferential statistics 
 In the funding preferences, to encourage using 
administrative solicitations the research 
proposals that respect the special purposes of the 
different statistical phyla. 
 To make paramount the criteria of significance, 
innovation, investigator capabilities, timeliness, 
and the momentum in assessing research 
proposals, so that funding will encourage 
innovation.  
 Leaders in peer review, such as editors and 
review administrators, should be made 
conversant with the major branches of statistics 
and their separate purposes, so as to ensure fair 
and goal-appropriate review, to identify errant 
reviewers for education or substitution, and to 
cull out inappropriate reviews. 
 To instruct peer-reviewers that to judge 
descriptive approaches by the rules of inferential 
formalism, or to judge inferential approaches by 
the rules of the purely exploratory sciences, is 
banned. Enforcement efforts should be active. 
 To institute consistent computer review of peer 
review documents to cull out for manual 
examination the possible pejorative uses of word 
roots such as “power” (as in underpowered, no 
power estimate), “hypothe” (as in weak 
hypothesis, not hypothesis-driven), “conclu” (as 
in rules for making conclusions, plan for 
concluding significance), “significan”, etc.. Not 
all uses would be inappropriate; for therapeutic 
trials, such an examination could be cursory. In 
the field of molecular pathology, such 
examination would be of paramount importance 
to ensure fair review and health of the field. 
 To encourage appeals of grant peer review for 
inappropriate scientific scope. Proposals to 
perform exploratory science in search of 
qualitative discoveries using the toolbox of 
descriptive statistics must not be reviewed 
according to a restricted scope, one in which 
inferential science, power estimates, incremental 
small differences, and excessive formal design 
are expected. 
 
While implementing these recommendations, certain 
broad concepts need to be kept in mind. Significance 
refers to the downstream impact anticipated should the 
mechanics of the proposal succeed, as adjusted by the 
Bayes’ prior probability of success. Neither the novelty 
nor the significance of an exploratory proposal depends 
on the efficiency of the methodological approach and 
perhaps not even on the proposed breadth of the study.  
When something novel is being pursued, it would be 
absurd to expect an accurate multi-year methodologic 
plan. Indeed, the favored methods, when undertaking 
descriptive approaches, may change yearly or even week-
by-week as technologies improve and as an investigator 
pursues new findings on-the-fly. The methods in 
inferential approaches, by contrast, are often much more 
rigid, given the necessity for an established plan that is 
adequately specific to support a power estimate and 
protocol-guided recruitment of patients or samples.  
In short, descriptive and inferential approaches to 
research do differ. Their infant science projects should be 
raised differently. Reforms are overdue. 
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